By the end of May 17, the visible flames around the Amarillo Landfill were under control. To drivers passing by, it probably looked like the emergency was winding down.
Inside the command post, firefighters saw something very different.
The landfill was still burning beneath the surface. Stronger southwest winds were expected the following day. And the firefighters who had spent hours battling the blaze were preparing to leave the scene.
One of the most persistent public perceptions about the Stinky Fire is that firefighters left because the fire was out.
The Potter County Fire Rescue reports tell a different story.
Nowhere in Chief Richard Lake's report does he say the landfill fire had been extinguished. Instead, the reports consistently describe a deep-seated fire that continued burning inside the landfill and required more dirt, more heavy equipment, and continued monitoring.
They also reveal something less widely known: not everyone agreed with the decision to end Potter County Fire Rescue's involvement that evening.
Chief Richard Lake said as much in his incident report.
"I did not agree with leaving."
Those five words have drawn considerable attention, but they weren't written in isolation. They came after an entire day of operational concerns that had been building since firefighters first arrived at the landfill.
Controlled Isn't the Same as Extinguished
By sunset, firefighters had accomplished an important objective.
They had stopped the fire from spreading beyond the landfill. Spot fires were extinguished. Nearby neighborhoods were no longer under an immediate threat, and Unified Command had stabilized what had become a difficult incident.
But the reports make an important distinction.
The landfill itself was still burning.
Assistant Chief Jonathan Stevens had already concluded that water alone would not extinguish the deep-seated refuse fire inside Cell 10.
His assessment was direct:
"The only viable mitigation method was smothering the burning refuse with dirt."
That wasn't a recommendation for cleanup after the fire. It was his assessment of what it would take to put the fire out.
That's an important difference.
Stopping a fire from spreading is not the same as eliminating the source of ignition. According to the reports, that source remained active inside the landfill.
Dirt, Not Water
Throughout the day, firefighters kept returning to the same solution: cover the burning refuse with dirt.
Stevens requested bulldozers shortly after arriving. Later he asked for additional operators and a motor grader to clear combustible debris along the fence line.
Those weren't routine requests. They reflected what crews were seeing on the ground.
The reports describe burning trash near the perimeter, refuse piled against catch fences, and embers being carried beyond the landfill by the wind. Firefighters believed heavy equipment—not more water—was the key to reducing those hazards.
The Phone Call
Late that afternoon, Stevens tried one more time to secure additional earth-moving equipment.
According to his incident narrative, he contacted Amarillo's Office of Emergency Management. OEM Director Max Dunlap connected him with Assistant City Manager Donnie Hooper.
Stevens wrote that he requested a motor grader to remove accumulated refuse and vegetation from the landfill perimeter. According to his report, Hooper responded that city operations complied with the landfill permit and that Stevens "did not understand the permit."
Stevens documented that he replied permit interpretation wasn't his concern.
His concern was protecting lives and nearby homes.
He ended that section of his report with a statement that has since received significant public attention:
"The call ended with an understanding that the city was not sending any additional operators or earth moving equipment."
That reflects Stevens' account of the conversation as recorded in his official incident report. It should not be interpreted as establishing the City's position or intent beyond what is documented there.
Dirt Operations Stop
The equipment discussion wasn't the only operational concern documented that evening.
According to Stevens, dirt-covering operations that had already begun inside the landfill were later stopped.
His report says that decision was made despite fire command's recommendation to continue using dirt as the primary extinguishment method, citing "long-term mitigation complications."
As with the earlier phone call, the report reflects Stevens' understanding of events. It does not explain the reasoning of city officials or landfill management.
What it does establish is that fire command believed covering the burning refuse remained the appropriate firefighting strategy.
Watching the Forecast
One detail buried in the reports deserves more attention than it has received.
Before Potter County Fire Rescue was released from the incident, command personnel discussed the weather forecast for the next day.
This wasn't written after the wildfire.
It wasn't hindsight.
It happened while crews were still on scene.
According to Chief Lake, everyone understood that stronger southwest winds were expected on May 18. Everyone also knew the landfill was still burning and that embers remained a concern.
The weather that arrived the next day wasn't a surprise.
Firefighters were already anticipating it.
"I Did Not Agree With Leaving"
Later that evening, Lake met with command staff regarding overnight operations.
According to his report, he was informed that Potter County Fire Rescue was being released because the City had hired a private contractor to continue extinguishment efforts the following morning.
Lake recorded that information without editorial comment.
Then he added a single sentence.
"I did not agree with leaving."
What makes that statement significant isn't simply the disagreement itself.
It's what Lake didn't write.
He didn't say firefighters were leaving because the fire was out.
He didn't say the danger had passed.
Instead, he documented that he disagreed with demobilizing while the landfill continued to burn.
They Didn't Simply Walk Away
The reports also challenge another common misconception—that Potter County simply packed up and left.
According to Lake, that's not what happened.
Potter County left a water tender at the landfill overnight to support ongoing operations. He also discussed returning personnel the following morning to patrol the perimeter because firefighters remained concerned about embers escaping under the forecasted wind conditions.
Those decisions speak for themselves.
Departments don't usually leave apparatus behind or plan additional patrols if they believe an incident is over.
The reports suggest firefighters believed continued vigilance was necessary.
What the Reports Show
One strength of the Potter County Fire Rescue reports is their restraint.
They're written the way incident reports are supposed to be written—chronological, factual, and focused on operations.
But when read together, they tell a consistent story.
Firefighters believed the landfill remained dangerous.
They believed dirt was essential to extinguishment.
They repeatedly requested additional heavy equipment.
They documented combustible material along the fence line.
They discussed the next day's forecast before leaving.
And one of their senior commanders put in writing that he disagreed with the decision to release Potter County resources.
None of those facts, by themselves, determine whether different decisions would have changed what happened the following afternoon.
But together, they provide important insight into what firefighters believed as the first operational period came to an end.
The Night Before
As darkness settled over the landfill, little suggested the destruction that would unfold less than 24 hours later.
The visible flames had diminished.
Some resources were released.
Others remained on scene.
The landfill, however, continued to burn beneath the surface.
The winds were still coming.
And the firefighters who had spent the day battling the fire had already documented many of the concerns that would later become the center of public debate.
They didn't know exactly what May 18 would bring.
But the reports leave little doubt about one thing:
They did not believe the incident was over.
In Part Three, the official timeline picks up the following afternoon. Chief Richard Lake documents hearing Amarillo Fire Department dispatch multiple units back to the landfill without receiving an update, requesting apparatus to watch for escaping embers, and witnessing the moment a single ember landed outside the landfill and ignited the wildfire that raced toward Bishop Estates. His report provides a detailed, minute-by-minute account of how a landfill fire became one of the most destructive neighborhood fires in Potter County history.
